

# Beyond the Frontiers

FRONTEX: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS



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# BEYOND THE FRONTIERS

Frontex: The First Five Years

Produced by Frontex Information and Transparency Team.

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# Introduction



BEYOND THE FRONTIERS highlights some of the more outstanding milestones and achievements of FRONTEX during its first five years. It is not an annual report, a study or a press release. Nor is it a comprehensive list of activities or events, or the people involved in them. It cannot be.

Instead, BEYOND THE FRONTIERS is a brief backward glance at a journey which began in 2005 when fewer than fifty people from across the European Union came together with one aim: to establish the organisation which would coordinate the challenges faced by an enlarged EU with an important common interest: a shared external border.

It was on 3 October 2005 that FRONTEX began working in Warsaw as an organisation. On that day, 27 experts seconded from national border guard authorities and 17 administrative staff sat around the table in temporary headquarters.

From laptops to pens, there was precious little equipment and no way to get it quickly. Yet before the end of the year that small group of ‘pioneers’ had coordinated the organisation’s first joint operation. How was it possible?

‘It was never going to be easy,’ says the founding Executive Director, Ilkka Laitinen. ‘But with determination and the right people, anything can be achieved.’

Ilkka Laitinen’s vision of FRONTEX was straightforward. He saw FRONTEX first and foremost as an

operational organisation. And that meant, that one way or the other, that FRONTEX would be working in the field before the end of 2005.

The first joint operation in December of that year, though necessarily small in scale compared to later FRONTEX joint operations, was well-conceived and perfectly timed. It targeted irregular immigration at the land border, focussing on illegal workers and ‘overstayers’, those foreign visitors who had entered the EU legitimately, but who had remained illegally. It was a success. FRONTEX was on its way.

- Coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders
- Assist Member States in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards
- Carry out risk analyses
- Follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders
- Assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders
- Provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations

## THE MAIN TASKS OF FRONTEX

The Executive Director's View:

## An Interview with Ilkka Laitinen



**‘We had nothing.  
We all started from  
scratch, so it was  
very basic.’**

**When did FRONTEX come into being?**

ILKKA LAITINEN: It was on 25 May 2005 when the first real action of the agency took place at the Marriott Hotel here in Warsaw. It was the first management board meeting and that was the meeting when I was selected and appointed. I went back to Helsinki, and next week I was back in Warsaw. That was the way it started.

**How were those early days?**

We had nothing. We all started from scratch, so it was very basic. We needed to learn the basic regulations, where we were working, get to know people and think about staffing and strategy for the agency.

**Did you have a clear strategy for FRONTEX at that stage?**

I had a strategy. Already, I think it was in early July, I had gathered some trusted colleagues (some of whom are working here still, by the way) and we started to work on the strategy of the agency. We started to think about organisational structure, about who could do what kind of job. Then we went to the European Commission to discuss a little bit, ask advice on things like staffing and budget. All the time we were thinking of more operational things too. So it was a very interesting and intense time. The

whole range of things were on the table at the same time.


**It sounds as if the Commission gave you a relatively free hand. Do you think that the structure of the organisation, or the way it is operating, would be different if the Commission had been more rigid?**

That could have been the case. The staffing certainly could have developed differently. Normally their recruitment for statutory staffing takes about one year. We couldn't afford to wait that long because we had to carry out operational activities very soon. I remember very well when I asked the Commission what were the options to recruit people. I was told that it needs time. Then I asked 'What about national experts?' 'Yes, but it is not how we do it.' 'Is it illegal?' I asked. 'That's not the ordinary way, but no it is not illegal.' 'OK,' I said. 'Then that's how we do it.' I think we gained about six to seven months by just hiring national experts. But that meant I was the only statutory staff member until the end of 2005.

**The first joint operation took place at the end of 2005. If you hadn't recruited staff that way would you have been able to carry out an operation at all in 2005?**

No.

FRONTEX Budget



**So in fact it would have been sometime in 2006 before anything happened?**

I think summer 2006 would have seen our first steps if we had followed usual recruitment procedures.

**And it was your intention to get the organisation operational as quickly as possible?**

I remember very well that meeting on 3 October 2005, in our first premises on the other bank side of the Wisła River. The office was so chaotic. For instance, I had my own personal laptop and there were people queuing to use it. We didn't have anything. Using our own internet accounts and all that kind of thing. I said there are many operational requirements, but one thing we must have is a joint operation coordinated in 2005. And that was it. It was land border operation on illegal labourers, overstayers.

**Did you think at that stage that you might not be able to do it?**

No. We didn't put any effort into thinking that way. Failing? It was not an option.

**That first operation must have been quite an important milestone in terms of the morale of the organisation.**

**Budgets** are a reflection of the level of activity expected of FRONTEX by the EU Member States. The substantial increase of our financial resources over the last four years therefore mirrors the growing importance of the immigration phenomena and the exceptional trust that the Member States of the European Union put in FRONTEX.'

Jose Carreira, Director of  
FRONTEX Administration  
Division

Certainly. It was a small group of people knowing that we have to start working immediately and that there was no one else who could carry it out. So they said 'Okay, what do we need to do? Where do we start?' And I think that attitude has somehow followed the whole development of the agency. We still have that pioneer spirit.

**After the first operation there was an enormous amount of work ahead of you. Is there a point when you finally felt everything had come together?**

I think that we haven't completely experienced that moment yet. But, personally, I had a feeling somewhere in 2008 that the system was working very smoothly. An indicator was that there were a lot of good things coming out of the agency which showed me that people were developing ideas without me having to be the spark. That was a good sign. Good risk analysis, good structures in place, contact with our partners. Then I think we could say: 'Ok, this is what we have planned, this is how it looks. What do we think?' The answer was: 'It's good.'

**In the early days were you worried about support from the Member States?**

I was a little bit, because the fact, even today, is that the Member States don't have an obligation



to participate in operational integration. But they did participate. That was very good. Even though we were not perfect, we were doing the right things. The Member States just said okay and started working together under the coordination of FRONTEX. It was a relief and very satisfying.

MALTA, 2007: FRONTEX Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen and Minister of Justice & Home Affairs Dr Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici visiting joint operation NAUTILUS

### What advantages do you think the Member States see in FRONTEX?

The Member States see that since we have no internal border control any more, we have to consider the challenges more widely, from a European perspective. And *voilà* FRONTEX is that body. I think another advantage is just bringing their 400,000 European border guards closer together. From the national heads of border control down, networking helps at different levels and in different sectors. That's one thing. We integrated the risk analysis units of the Member States. FRONTEX brought together the training coordinators of different Member States. We started to create a European curriculum for basic training which is already applied by all the Member States. And then there's the work in the research and development community. A lot of things in a very short time.

**'The activities of FRONTEX are intelligence-driven. It must be stressed that FRONTEX does not replace the national border management systems of participating Member States; instead it complements and provides added value to those systems.'**

Gil Arias Fernández, FRONTEX  
Deputy Executive Director

### What is left to do?

Someone has said that FRONTEX has become a hostage of its own successes. We surprised people in some ways, but that kind of exceptional effort has become expected. So people tend to think this is normal and now we have to do it. From 2006 to 2007 we tripled the delivery of training activities. We doubled operational activities in one year. We have had to incorporate big increases in budget and staff. Someone said that a private company whose financial resources are developing as drastically as FRONTEX's would be in trouble because they could not absorb or manage that. But FRONTEX has done it. We had to. We had no choice.

### How much more can FRONTEX do? Or by doing that will it again become a 'hostage' to success?

I think we have to take two views on that. We can focus on quantity and we can focus on quality. Preferably both, so we achieve more at a higher standard. But from late 2008 it's been a question of strengthening the foundation, building the structure and extending capabilities. Doing these basic things. For now we must not focus too much on expanding the quantity of what we do, but evaluate the organisation, think about what we are doing and how the different areas—risk analysis, research and development, and so on—how they are linked, our collaboration with

other players like Interpol and Europol, and how we cooperate with Third Countries.

**How important are Third Countries to FRONTEX?**

They are very important. We must understand that border security does not start and does not end at the border. It is just one area in which we are performing our duties. There should be no barriers between law enforcement in the Member States and Third Countries. In a way we are all on one side of the border together and on the opposite side are the criminal organisations who are exploiting and abusing people for their own purposes. And we have seen how effective we can be if our neighbouring countries who are outside Europe working towards the same goal. We have good examples in Africa, such as Senegal and Mauritania.

**Even with good law enforcement cooperation, isn't there still the difficulty that while you know how many people you catch at the border, you don't know how many got through?**

Exactly. The so-called 'dark figures dilemma'.

That's always tricky in the law enforcement area. The figures can show zero to demonstrate that there is no problem or the figures can be zero to show that there is no adequate action.

**A PERMANENT BASE:**

the opening of the new FRONTEX Headquarters, 27 March 2007  
(left to right: Ilkka Laitinen, Franco Frattini, Wolfgang Schäuble)



**Does this come back to more cooperation and information sharing with other agencies and also the cooperation with Third Countries on the other side of the border?**

Yes. More cooperation and also understanding the overall picture. And also accepting that we need to know ourselves as well as the challenge. We can be part of the problem if we don't evaluate ourselves. And that is very sensitive area. We have to be constructive in any criticism of the effectiveness of Member States border guard organisations. No-one should just point the fin-


ger and blame-and-shame. It doesn't help and there will be a counter reaction to this. What we would like to have in the future is a systematic approach to evaluating and assessing our real impact on threats to EU border security. We're working on it.

**How important is a common immigration policy for the EU?**

Very important. I see no alternative, because we have Schengen, we don't have internal border controls in place. The playing field is open. We cannot simply take the national approach to this. We have to think European-wide. In some areas of border control we have made certain steps, we have a system of European oriented operations. But in other ways we still have very nationally oriented approaches to things, such as deciding eligibility for asylum. As long as this fundamental question of immigration is not European-wide, we will continue to have to deal with it. We have had to postpone or even cancel some maritime operations because there was no solution about what to do with people who have been picked up or rescued. So I see no choice but to have a common policy. However, it is quite a challenge for citizens to start thinking in a more European way. It will take a long time. It really is a challenge.

## THE SCHENGEN AREA

The Schengen area now extends along 42,672 km of external sea borders and 8,826 km of land borders. It comprises 25 countries (including a number of non-EU states), meaning free internal movement for nearly half a billion people. However, removal of checks at internal borders makes the control of external borders much more important, since all Schengen members are now reliant on the checks made by other members. Simply put, the Schengen area border is only as strong as its weakest link.



**What changes would you like to see to the mandate of FRONTEX?**

FRONTEX needs equipment so that we are not too dependent on the Member States, so that we don't have to make too many compromises.

**So it would give you more operational autonomy, even if it was one helicopter?**

Exactly. We need more reaction capacity to cope with unpredictable events. That is one thing. We also need incentives to Third Countries. It would be a good thing if FRONTEX could be the European actor in terms of capacity building programs in Third Countries, so that we have something to give them.

**Are there any other changes you would welcome?**

Yes. A third change relates to information management. I think it was good that from the beginning we were extremely clear that we must be an intelligence-driven organisation. But what we are missing is the opportunity to process information that contains personal data. We understand that it is a very sensitive issue from the data protection point of view and we know how important it is to have protection in place. But having seen developments over many years, I am quite convinced that if we are not

able to process all information, including that which contains personal data, we will not be able to fulfil the potential of the agency.

**Does that make you feel that you are fighting criminals, for example, those who traffic in human beings, with one hand tied behind your back?**

That's right. It's intensely frustrating when you really think the answer to a crime is in the information, but you cannot touch it to analyse it properly.

**Do you think FRONTEX will have that kind of capability eventually?**

We will see. It is a choice between data protection and operational needs. I am convinced that we are able to justify the need.

**If you look back on your time here what would you like to be remembered for?**

I don't think I need that much personal appreciation or personal acknowledgment. Preferably I would like to see that people understand how much the agency has been able to deliver. And if so, it is my privilege to be able to lead such an organisation for a while.

**'When I arrived at FRONTEX in 2008 I found an agency run by a firm leader with operations well underway. In particular, I was impressed with the high level of professionalism and expertise of the people working here. It is a real pleasure to work with such people.'**

Klaus Rösler, Director of  
FRONTEX Operations Division

**You were the first executive director. From the professional point of view what have you found most satisfying?**

I think the overall management. The successful management of a European organisation that started work in such a small way and has grown so successfully. That is the most satisfying thing. You can look at it and say: 'Hey, we're doing the right things. It works!'

FRONTEx occupies four floors in the Rondo I building, Warsaw



The First Joint Operation:

## Fast and Effective

From the beginning FRONTEx showed that it was a dynamic organisation. In late 2005, only two months after it started operating from makeshift headquarters with a skeleton staff, an opportunity presented itself and the organisation was quick to act.



A risk analysis report prepared by FRONTEX highlighted a significant phenomenon. The problem of illegal workers and ‘overstayers’ (people who enter the European Union legally then breach the law by not leaving before their visas expire) was well known. However, careful study of the situation revealed a trend which could permit FRONTEX to deal effectively with the problem in the immediate future.

### THE OPPORTUNITY

FRONTEX experts realised that the return flow of Third Country nationals was the key to tackling the problem. If it were possible to identify an illegal worker on exit from the EU it would be a simple matter to apply an entry ban to prevent the next entry by that person.

The alternative, to investigate later and apprehend irregular migrants deep within Europe and then send them back to their home countries, would always be far more expensive than preventing entry at the external border.

And dealing effectively with the issue at the external border would minimise the ever-present problem of having irregular immigrants inside EU countries devoid of legal protection who were thus vulnerable to criminal exploitation.

In November 2005 FRONTEX was aware that there was a large flow of irregular immigrants

leaving the EU for their home countries across the external land border and that it would increase as the end of the year approached. Many of these people would try to re-enter the EU early in the new year.

Although the FRONTEX headquarters was still in the early stages of being established, the opportunity to take advantage of the circumstances was too good. FRONTEX immediately decided to mount a joint operation at the eastern border of the

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**‘The lesson we learned from 2005 is that **WE can trust** the Member States. They want to cooperate...’**

Jozsef Bali,  
Head of Land Border Sector



## EU Border Numbers

**1792**

the number of designated Border Crossing Points

**500 million**

the total number of border crossings per year

**3 to 8 million**

the approximate number of irregular migrants inside the EU

**300,000**


the number of refusals of entry per year (excluding 600,000 refusals in Melilla and Ceuta, Spain)

**80%**

the proportion of irregular migrants inside the Schengen area

**50%**

the proportion of irregular migrants who entered legally



**THE LATEST TECHNOLOGY:**

a Polish border officer checks the authenticity of a document



European Union/Schengen area in the second half of December: less than two months away. It was to be an operation which in many ways would lay the foundation of FRONTEX.

**THE PLANNING**

A meeting convened by FRONTEX to discuss the operation with EU Member States was quickly set up, but it had not gone far when a potentially critical hurdle was discovered which might have prevented the operation going any further.

As Jozsef Bali, the Head of FRONTEX Land Border Sector, recalls: 'We started to work out how we would do it, what kind of operational plan we would use, how we would reach the main objectives, when someone in the middle of this planning phase pointed out that we didn't have financial rules. That meant we had to tell the participating Member States: "Sorry we would really like to implement this operation but in this case we will not be able to reimburse your additional costs".'

The financial problems might have been a critical stumbling block to the operation, but instead of hesitancy from Member States, the fledgling FRONTEX received unreserved support. 'I was really happy,' said Jozsef Bali. 'We got only positive feedback. The Member States said the financial

**'The countries on the external border are really active. I have never met during these five years with a refusal from a Member State saying "we won't take part in this operation". They really are partners and they understand that these joint operations are support to them and they can only win from these operations.'**

Jozsef Bali,  
Head of Land Border Sector

Jozsef Bali,  
Head of Land  
Border Sector

**‘For me the most awful part of the job is when the organised crime groups traffic children to use in Europe for different purposes. It’s terrible. An adult can decide on his or her own life and say “I want something and I know the risk”. But not a child. So it’s the most awful and hated thing for me.’**



background doesn’t matter, it’s a good idea, and it’s the first FRONTEX activity. We want to participate and we want to work together.’

The timing of the operation was crucial. The end of the year would see seasonally high numbers of foreign citizens leaving the EU via the land borders. Many of these would be legitimate foreign workers taking the opportunity to visit their home countries. However, amongst the travellers a proportion would comprise people who had overstayed visas or who were working illegally in the European Union (some of whom would have been trafficked or smuggled into the EU by organised crime ‘facilitators’).

#### THE OPERATION

On 16 December 2005 the first phase of the joint operation on the eastern land border began. Concentrating on Third Country nationals leaving the EU, the FRONTEX-led operation aimed to identify travellers from non-EU countries who had stayed longer than authorised. It also had a secondary aim of detecting forged travel documents and other illegal activities.

‘Of course,’ explained Jozsef Bali, ‘if you have to select where you focus your staff normally you always focus on entry, and less on exit. But from the point of view of internal security affected by illegal

labourers and overstayers, the exit check has the same importance as the entry check.’

So, as people exited the EU in the operational area, no action was taken against those who had been in the EU illegally. However, in preparation for the second phase of the operation which would begin in January, care was taken to note those who had broken the law.

Several weeks later, during the second phase of the operation, illegal workers who had left during the first phase and then tried to return to the European Union in the new year found their entry denied.

It was simple, but very effective. At just the right moment significant pressure had been applied to an acute irregular immigration problem. Time, money and law-enforcement assets which would have been spent locating irregular immigrants deep within the Schengen area had been saved and could now be used for other tasks.

## THE RESULTS

Joint Operation ILLEGAL LABOURERS was not only a success in terms of detecting illegal workers and overstayers. The ramifications of FRONTEX’s first joint operation went much further. Forged documents, trafficking in human beings and smuggling had also been uncovered.

Moreover, the information gained and the techniques used would influence and enhance the many joint operations which followed. But in retrospect perhaps the most significant success of the operation was the confidence it engendered.

FRONTEX had proven that it could mount an effective operation rapidly with minimal resources—its professionalism was beyond doubt. From the FRONTEX point of view it was now clear that it could rely on the willing support of Member States.

For the personnel of the nine Member States involved, it was the beginning of a new era in co-operation at the operational level which would rapidly increase the transfer of knowledge and expertise amongst them, and many other European border guards, as more joint operations were launched in the coming years.

**‘During FRONTEX’s first full year of operations, all Member States and Schengen Associated Countries participated in at least one FRONTEX activity, whether it was in the field of joint operations, pilot projects, risk analysis, training or research and development. It was a comprehensive vote of confidence in the agency.’**

Rustamas Liubajevs,  
Head of Joint Operations  
Unit

Meeting the Common Challenge:

## 'The Highest Possible Standard'

One of the most wide-ranging and important tasks of FRONTEX is constantly being carried out across the European Union. Without it the whole concept of coordinated management of the EU's external border would be at risk.



FRONTEX training is as broad as it is deep. From fundamental rights to language instruction, air-crew training to dog handling, detection of stolen vehicles to identification of forged documents, the skills and professionalism of the EU's border guards are in greater harmony and at a higher collective level than ever before.

It was no surprise to find in the early joint operations, when the border guards of various EU Member States came together under FRONTEX coordination, a diversity of procedures and varying levels of training and specialist expertise.

This disparity had been foreseen when FRONTEX was established. For that reason, and from the outset, FRONTEX had been given the task of assisting Member States in training national border guards, as well as in establishing common training standards across the European Union.

## THE CORE

Common training for EU border guards was not a new idea. Several years before FRONTEX started operations the need for uniform standards across the EU was recognised and work was begun by an *ad hoc* centre. Then, when FRONTEX came into being, the crucial task of developing this training naturally passed to the agency.

However, it was not going to be easy. Soon after FRONTEX started operations in late 2005 the responsibility for training was given to a newly created training unit. Initially the new unit comprised only one person (though in mid-2006 another staff member was added).

That founding member of the training unit, and its current head, Reinhard Lintner, recalls the challenge of those first days: 'I was the first to start training unit activities, but I was able to engage experts from the Member States.'

- The training of border guard officers based on the **Common Core Curriculum** developed by FRONTEX guarantees common quality measurable standards comparable within all the EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. Moreover, common training tools have also been prepared by FRONTEX for Member States to use in their training programmes for Third Countries.
- The **Common Core Curriculum** is divided into four modules: general, air, land and sea borders. Border guards not only acquire basic knowledge and skills, but additional specialised modules are added according to national needs.

**'Only the highest possible standard is acceptable.'**

Reinhard Lintner,  
Head of Training Unit

'It is only possible to maintain the **highest standard** by constant reflection, by continually updating yourself and the team. And also by calling on **outside help**, such as from the universities we have on board. They assess what we do and certify that our work conforms with European standards of training. We've got **extremely** high standards, and we will keep it that way.'

Reinhard Lintner,  
Head of Training Unit

**over  
400 000**

border guards and police officers involved in EU border management will benefit from FRONTEX training

**200**

training development activities are carried out annually by the FRONTEX Training Unit

**156**

experts from Member States, Schengen Associated Countries and countries having working arrangements with FRONTEX contribute to Training Unit activities

**136**

national training academies and schools exist throughout the European Union

**9**

FRONTEX Partnership Academies have been established throughout the European Union



First aid training

The initial curriculum which FRONTEX had inherited was updated with the support of more than 40 experts from all Member States. There were numerous consultations with universities and international organisations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), as well as discussions with other national organisations and NGOs.

The development of the Common Core Curriculum for EU border guard basic training was a huge task, and the preparation of training tools such as Detection of False Documents and Stolen Cars Detection, provided an additional challenge.

## IMPLEMENTATION

After two years of intensive development, the Common Core Curriculum for EU border guard basic training was ready in 2008 for incorporation into national training systems in all EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries which, in total, had more than 400,000 people involved in border management.

However, to train so many people was not FRONTEX's task: it remained a Member States' responsibility. And, in any case, the FRONTEX Training Unit is not a school—its role is to oversee, guide and develop the common training standards essential for border guards.

Consequently, training coordinators were nominated by each Member State and Schengen Associated Country to act as training advisors for FRONTEX and to support the implementation of common training standards in their respective countries.

With an eye to the future, in December 2005 FRONTEX had also established a partnership academy system so that training development could take place in Partnership Academies located in several Member States.

Currently there are about 136 national training academies and schools for border guards within the



EU. It is in these places of learning that, in addition to inculcating the highest standards of professionalism, the groundwork of current and future cooperation between Member States during joint operations is laid.

## RESULTS

FRONTEX is dedicated to improving the professional knowledge of Member States' border guards and establishing common training standards for the 400,000 people involved in border management in the European Union.

**'IOM has showed a lot of understanding of our needs, making us better aware of the interaction between border management activities and migrants or travellers who need to cross the external borders.'**

Richard Ares Baumgartner,  
External Relations officer


WORKING TOGETHER:  
air-maritime coordination training around  
Lampedusa Island



Looking back, Reinhard Lintner sees the Member States' appreciation of the value of common training as the biggest achievement so far: 'We were able to convince the Member States that they should follow this idea of harmonised training at a high standard with European certification. This is the only basis for sustainable operations in the future.'

The scope of the training role given to FRONTEX in 2005 was ambitious, but five years later its successful implementation is well underway. Moreover, the significance of this training cannot be overstated.

Not only will the training developed so carefully by FRONTEX enable Integrated Border Management to develop and grow stronger in the coming years, but it also provides an opportunity to extend operational cooperation with Third Countries, which is increasingly important.



Joint Operation HERA:

## 'The Birth of Sea Operations'

In 2006 FRONTEX mounted its first major operation at sea. Joint Operation HERA was the response to an enormous surge in irregular immigration from West Africa to Spain's Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean.




Tens of thousands of citizens from countries such as Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde, attracted by the prospect of life in Europe and lured by the relative proximity of the Canary Islands, had decided to risk a hazardous sea voyage in ill-equipped open boats known as cayucos.

If this flow could be stemmed, not only would a major irregular immigration route to Europe be closed, but thousands of deaths by drowning could be prevented each year as overloaded boats (sometimes with more than one hundred people jammed aboard) set out on a long and treacherous journey.

### THE PLAN

HERA required careful planning. 'It was not only our first joint sea operation,' recalls Georgios Vourekas, Head of FRONTEX Sea Border Sector. 'It was the first time we operated in cooperation with a Third Country. Some people were sceptical, but we were not there to fail.'

Taking into account the fact that Spain, the EU Member State most affected, had already reached a political agreement with some West African countries to tackle irregular immigration, a rigorous assessment of the situation by the FRONTEX Risk Analysis Unit suggested a two-pronged approach to the problem.



On the Canary Islands, Operation HERA would provide support to the Spanish authorities in interviewing the would-be migrants who were fortunate enough to survive the ocean journey and reach the Canaries.


At sea, the focus was to be on joint patrols off the western coast of Africa involving personnel and equipment from several EU Member States as well as from Senegal and Mauritania.

The close proximity of these joint maritime and airborne patrols to the coast of West Africa was crucial: it meant that the unseaworthy boats used by the irregular immigrants could be stopped and turned back to safety before the dangerous voyage to the Canary Islands could claim even more lives.

FRONTEX had no illusions about the difficulties of the operation. 'Before HERA we had 32,000 arrivals a year in the Canary Islands,' said Georgios Vourekas. 'The methodology of the organised crime people facilitating this flow of migrants was adaptable. We knew we faced a real challenge.'

FRONTEX  
Sea Operations  
Officer

'It is very very **painful** to pick up dead people, to know that other people are missing. Of course we feel. Of course we have **feelings**, of course it is frightening when you see people in boats like this.'





### THE GROUNDWORK

The first stage of the operation, known as HERA I, began on 17 July 2006. Experts from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom flew to the Canary Islands to help Spanish officials cope with the mammoth task of interviewing and assisting the West African survivors.

Some migrants had been fortunate enough to reach the islands without serious mishap. Others, stranded and distressed, had been picked up at sea by Operation HERA patrol vessels.

Identification of these individuals was of paramount importance. Without knowing who a person was and where he or she had come from, it was impossible to identify genuine asylum seekers who may have been fleeing war or political persecution. As one FRONTEx sea operations officer put it: 'The most difficult task is the huge number of people we face. There are people who need our help and we need to identify them. It is a huge challenge.'

### PATROLS BEGIN

Meanwhile, less than a month later, Operation HERA II began. Patrol boats and aircraft from

THE SURVIVORS:  
a patrol boat from  
the Armed Forces of  
Malta reaches a group  
of migrants in an  
overloaded boat

Spain, Portugal and Italy (and later Finland) searched the sea between the West African coast and the Canary Islands, turning back irregular immigrants in cayucos near the coast or rescuing those who had managed to go farther and then found themselves lost in the Atlantic Ocean without food or water.

The logistics involved in HERA II were daunting: moving personnel and equipment from Europe, adapting operating procedures and machines, and setting up support infrastructure had to be done quickly and efficiently.

But the hard work paid off and soon European and African officials were at sea together on



### ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS STATISTICS

## 31,700

irregular immigrants  
arrived in the Canary  
Islands in 2006

each other's vessels. Under this arrangement the authority for returning cayucos setting off from Africa rested with the Senegalese and Mauritanian officials involved in the FRONTEX operation.

Colonel Eduardo Lobo, of the Spanish Guardia Civil, explained FRONTEX's relationship with the local officials: 'The FRONTEX members provide the platform and support them but they are the authority for intercepting and returning the boats.'

And so here, too, HERA was breaking new ground: the combined effort with African authorities had been a test for the first operation to take



UNSEAWORTHY:  
thousands of people have  
perished in boats like these  
cayucos

**12,500**

irregular immigrants  
arrived in the Canary  
Islands in 2007

**9,200**

irregular immigrants  
arrived in the Canary  
Islands in 2008

**2,200**

irregular immigrants  
arrived in the Canary  
Islands in 2009

place in cooperation with a Third Country. Yet despite the complexity of the operation, and the long distance from mainland Europe, it had worked well.

The immediate results of HERA were impressive. By the end of October 2006 almost 19,000 irregular immigrants had arrived on the Canary Islands. Yet FRONTEX experts and the Spanish authorities involved in HERA I were able to identify every person.

These would-be immigrants, and the thousands of others turned back at the West African coast under HERA II, were the lucky ones. The number who

FRONTEX Sea Operations  
Officer

'I was on mission last week. It was Force 8 to Force 9. **Thunderstorm with hail.** We got the call that there was a search and rescue case. We started looking just as the weather got very bad. Out of 12 people who were reported missing, eight of them had been washed dead onto the shore. Among these there was a seven-year-old girl. I helped the coast guard put her into a body-bag. This girl had been **promised heaven** in the European Union, but she had been cheated of her life. She paid to be dead. The facilitators, the people traffickers, left her to die. It's very painful, very distressing.'

NOTHING TO LOSE: a Guardia Civil patrol boat rammed by traffickers



died en route is also estimated to be in the thousands.

The interviews had another important benefit. As more information was received, verified and analysed, it was possible to build a picture of the criminal infrastructure which had launched so many vulnerable people on a harsh and dangerous journey. As a result, a number of the unscrupulous 'facilitators' who took money from desperate people unaware of the dangers they faced were arrested.

## THE WAY FORWARD

Although Joint Operation POSEIDON began around the same time, these first HERA operations became the foundation of all joint sea operations.

The success enjoyed by Joint Operations HERA I and II in tackling irregular immigration has been repeated and built upon in the years which followed. And not just in the subsequent HERA operations—which have indeed effectively checked the flow of irregular immigrants to the Canary Islands—but also in the many other successful joint sea operations, such as INDALO, HERMES and POSEIDON, which are continuing.

The problems posed during HERA have all been overcome: operating in unusual environments, formulating new procedures, fastening partnerships

with Third Countries, coordinating a myriad of agencies to achieve one goal.

Indeed, FRONTEX sea operations have not only continued to face and overcome the monumental challenges set in October 2005 when the agency started operations, but have also grown to the stage where FRONTEX is now apparently 'the largest search and rescue operation on the planet'.

And Joint Operation HERA was pivotal in achieving success. Before Operation Hera everything was theory. But after HERA the way forward was clear. In the words of Georgios Vourekas: 'It was the birth of sea operations.'

**'We have to stop the facilitators.  
They have no remorse.  
Justice has to be done.'**

FRONTEX  
Sea Operations Officer

The Broader Picture:

## The Mediterranean

From a certain point in Spain it is possible to glimpse both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Without question Joint Operation HERA proved to be an astounding achievement in dealing with irregular immigration in the Atlantic. But there was no doubt in anyone's mind where the future focus of maritime attention lay: the Mediterranean Sea.



From its inception, FRONTEX set out to tackle the challenge of coordinating the control of the European Union's long maritime southern border. In fact, one of the earliest tasks given by the European Council was to investigate the feasibility of improving coordinated monitoring of the Mediterranean.

Not surprisingly, this was dubbed the MEDSEA Study. It was to become an important early landmark in establishing the organisation and structure needed to tackle the problems created by irregular immigration in the Mediterranean.

### THE MEDSEA STUDY

In early 2006 the MEDSEA study, which looked at the feasibility of a Mediterranean coastal patrol network, was quickly followed by another study, BORTEC, which considered the associated challenge of establishing a surveillance system covering not only the entire southern maritime border of the EU, but also the open sea beyond.

As a result of the MEDSEA and BORTEC studies, FRONTEX was given the task of pulling these concepts together and solving the problem of how best to secure the EU's southern border with a maritime patrol network operating within a European border surveillance system (to be known as EUROSUR).

### A EUROPEAN PATROL NETWORK

In December 2006 a small FRONTEX team led by Einar Dale, who had worked on the previous studies, threw itself into the task of producing a practical, operating patrol system.

'I think people thought they were going to see the vessels out there very soon after we started work,' said Einar Dale. 'But what we said was that this is not possible without the organisational structure to handle it. The Member States first needed to have a functioning system to coordinate their vessels.'

This was no easy task considering that the FRONTEX team had to somehow pull together up to 50 authorities operating under 30 ministries in eight countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus).

'For example,' explained Einar Dale, 'there could be problems because maybe two vessels from the same country, one from the fisheries authority, the other from the coast guard, both covered the same area. That could be duplication of effort within the country. So the coordination needed to be internal between national authorities, as well as external between the Member States.'

The eight Member States opted for a regional approach as the first step, based on bilateral cooperation between neighbouring countries.

## THE EU CONCEPT OF INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT

- Border control (checks and surveillance) as defined in the Schengen Borders Code, including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence.
- Detection and investigation of border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement authorities.
- The four-tier access control model (control measures within the area of free movement including return, border control, cooperation with neighbouring countries, measures in Third Countries).
- Inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs, police, national security and other relevant authorities) and international cooperation.
- Coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and Institutions and other bodies of the Community and the Union.

ON THE LOOKOUT:

an Italian Guardia di Finanza helicopter searches the Mediterranean



FRONTEX then set to work providing help in drawing up operational plans, defining the geographical areas to be covered and the allocation and use of resources.


In May 2007 the European Patrols Network officially began to operate. The goal was a network of centres in Member States which could share information with each other to ensure that neighbouring Member States, such as Spain and France, effectively coordinated their activities to best control the southern maritime border.

‘In that way,’ said Einar Dale, ‘the Member States could plan together, know who was in the neighbouring area, and work daily alongside each other. And there was a link in the network to FRONTEX, so that we were there to support them in the coordination job.’

### THE EUROPEAN BORDER SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

One year later it was decided that similar national coordination centres should also be set up in the EU Member States on the eastern land borders and the maritime borders on the Black Sea.

These coordination centres, as well as being the centre of a national border surveillance system, would cover portions of the EU external border. It was envisaged that FRONTEX would receive information from the national coordination centres in



### **REDUCE THE DEATH TOLL OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS BY RESCUING MORE LIVES AT SEA**

Many illegal immigrants and persons in need of international protection travel in conditions of extreme hardship and take great personal risks in their attempts to enter the EU illegally by hiding in vehicles, on cargo vessels, etc. The recent practice of travelling on board of unseaworthy and overcrowded boats, has multiplied the number of unfortunate migrants who continue to lose their lives by drowning in the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and the Canary Islands and in the Mediterranean Sea.

The tragic death toll resulting from this kind of illegal immigration is unacceptable and must therefore be significantly reduced. The capacity to detect small boats in the open sea must be enhanced, contributing to greater chances of search and rescue and thereby saving more lives at sea. However, long-term solutions to the challenges posed by migration management can only be achieved through a comprehensive strategy that includes cooperation with Third Countries, also on border surveillance.

European Commission memo/o8/86,  
Brussels, 13 Feb 2008

### **INCREASE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE EU AS A WHOLE BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE PREVENTION OF CROSS-BORDER CRIME**

Border surveillance has not only the purpose of preventing unauthorised border crossings, but also countering cross-border crime such as the prevention of terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug smuggling, illicit arms trafficking etc.

To counter these threats is first and foremost a task for the police forces and intelligence services of Member States. However, an effective border management system both at national and European level will provide a valuable tool for fighting cross-border crime.

European Commission  
memo/o8/86, Brussels, 13 Feb 2008

order to be able to conduct joint operations and for the purposes of risk analysis.

Furthermore, under such a system, FRONTEX could also serve as an EU-wide situation centre, rapidly receiving and disseminating information about incidents occurring along the EU external borders.




## THE FUTURE

The work on the European Patrols Network and the wider European Border Surveillance System continues today, methodically increasing the effectiveness of Member States in the fight against transnational crime and reducing the number of lives lost in hazardous attempts to enter the EU illegally.

Moreover, like so many FRONTEX activities and responsibilities, these initiatives sprang from the application and dedication of a few hand-chosen experts toiling long hours to lay the foundations of a ground-breaking integrated border management system in record time.

‘The MEDSEA study was the foundation of everything which followed,’ according to Einar Dale. ‘BORTEC and the European Patrols Network came from that. And of course EUROSUR as well. They all came from MEDSEA.’



Joint Operation HAMMER:

## A Flexible Response

In 2008 Framework Joint Operation HAMMER introduced a groundbreaking approach to air border operations. Designed to disrupt criminal activities by applying intense localised pressure on air borders for a specific period, the operation proved successful.




The aim of FRONTEX Air Border Sector is to help Member States grapple with the challenge of detecting illegal entries to the EU at airports and yet maintain the smooth, efficient flow of enormous numbers of legitimate passengers.

To achieve that goal, Air Border Sector selects relevant flights, initiates checks of documents, updates the profiles and modus operandi of potential irregular immigrants, and collects information which can be used to identify and arrest smugglers and traffickers.

### THE CHALLENGE

Within the FRONTEX operational area there are more than 300 airports with external connections to Third Countries. About half of these are small airports handling insignificant amounts of traffic which are relatively easy to monitor. That leaves about 150 major airports which are large enough to be acceptable targets for transnational criminal activity, in particular smuggling and trafficking in human beings.

Moreover, the European Union has more than 250 million individual air crossings of the external air border. Taking into account that the figure usually included both entry and exit, that number of crossings represented about 125 million people.



The statistics worried the Head of Air Border Sector, Claudio Kavrecic: ‘If just one percent of those visitors was an irregular traveller, we were speaking about more than one million people entering Europe irregularly. So what did it mean for us to mount an operation involving only 20–25 airports and deploying just 20 guest officers for one month?’

Kavrecic was already aware that during previous joint operations, irregular immigrants and traffickers simply suspended travel for the duration or switched to other airports, of which there were many. ‘So the level of our efficiency and effectiveness was low. From the operational point of view we had to think about a new module. It was necessary to change our approach.’

**‘Weekly our risk analysis is receiving data from up to 128 airports. If they notice something strange, we will immediately activate an operation. It’s not easy, it’s a complex job, but it is probably a matter of the trust that they have in us and we have in them.’**

Claudio Kavrecic,  
Head of Air Border Sector

**‘HAMMER was really quite a significant change.’**

## A CHANGE OF SCALE

Joint Operation HAMMER was designed to take the fight against irregular entries into the EU by air to a new level. The plan was to broaden operations, shifting from a local to a regional perspective. The method chosen was surprisingly simple.

Under previous joint operations a small number of airports would be scrutinised for one month, targeting irregular immigration from a particular country using a certain modus operandi. While this was effective in a limited area, such operations also inevitably caused the displacement of illegal activities to other airports until the operation finished.

If people traffickers were just switching airports when pressure was applied at a few border control points for a long period, why not decide to target many points for shorter periods and at the same time gather valuable intelligence?

The way to do this was to select a region where a large number of officers could be deployed in several countries affected by the problem and squeeze the irregular immigrant flow at selected airports to force the people traffickers to change their modus operandi. Then quickly analyse the effect and move rapidly to the new airports targeted by the human traffickers and do the same.

ONE BORDER:  
officers from several EU countries check passports  
at the airport in Porto





EXPLOITING IGNORANCE:  
criminals sell sham documents of bogus countries at extortionate prices

This was a more dynamic and efficient utilisation of officers because they were always being deployed where they were needed based on the most up-to-date intelligence and risk analysis.

### THE PLAN

The detailed plan for HAMMER called for three operational phases to be carried out between September and December 2008. In each area designated for the operation, 95-to-99 per cent of all non-Schengen flights would be scrutinised.

The resources necessary for such an ambitious operation included several FRONTEX Joint Support Teams (the first time they had been used), as well as guest officers and special advisors from 25 countries—233 experts in all—who were deployed to 189 locations chosen after thorough risk analysis.

In addition to the contributions from the border authorities of Member States and Schengen-associated countries, several partners such as Europol, Interpol, UNHCR and the EU Council General Secretariat-FADO took part in the operation.

It was a joint air border operation on an unprecedented scale.

**‘Air borders must not be neglected when talking about effective border control. The situation is twofold: on the one hand, refused entry for persons inadequately documented; on the other, the fact that most people who become irregular immigrants enter the territory of the EU legally and then deliberately overstay their visas. In 2009 there were 55,000 refusals of entry at air borders, which accounts for 49 per cent of all refusals of entry at the EU external borders.’**

Klaus Rösler, Director of Operations Division

## FRONTEX SITUATION CENTRE

### THE OPERATION

However, despite its size and complexity, Joint Operation HAMMER was successful right from the start because it was flexible.

Each of its operational phases comprised two weeks, followed by two weeks of analysis. Information from previous phases, and other FRONTEX joint operations, was then used to decide where to deploy officers during the next operational phase.

‘It was like squeezing a balloon full of water,’ recalls Claudio Kavrecic. ‘You squeeze, then watch to see what displacement the pressure causes. Then you move and apply new pressure to the displacement and watch again what happens.’

The operation was thus a superb demonstration of the Agency’s ability to deploy large numbers of guest officers and special advisors at short notice, yet still be able to brief and prepare people to deal with different problems at varying locations in each phase of their deployment.

‘It worked well,’ says Claudio Kavrecic. ‘It was clearly a more efficient and effective use of resources, because in this way you can deploy officers where they are actually needed.’

Joint Operation HAMMER was the first operation to test and utilise, over an extended period of time, the newly established FRONTEX Situation Centre.

During HAMMER the Situation Centre proved to be extremely efficacious in collecting and verifying data, as well as providing essential feedback, in the form of daily situation reports, to National FRONTEX Points of Contact (NFPOC), airport border airport authorities and FRONTEX management.

Coordination of operations requires a centralised point where all information

about the situation in all operational areas is collected and can be easily accessed by all involved. The FRONTEX Situation Centre ensures that timely, verified and consistent information about the situation at the EU’s external borders is readily available.

All information coming into the agency, as well as open sources, such as the media, are constantly monitored. By providing early warning, the Situation Centre contributes to the fast and efficient management of emergencies by both FRONTEX and individual Member States.

### THE RESULTS

Until Joint Operation HAMMER the most airports targeted in one year by FRONTEX was 27, in 2007. Yet by the end of 2008, 115 airports had been subject to intense FRONTEX coordinated activity under Joint Operation HAMMER alone. That represented a four-fold increase.

The results were more than just impressive statistics. As a result of HAMMER, FRONTEX began to receive an extensive amount of up-to-date information on irregular immigration at the air borders which until then had not been available for risk analysis.

**'A woman trafficked into prostitution in an EU country will have to work ten hours a day and have at least 20 customers per day in order to pay back the facilitators who organised her entry into the EU. And she will have to do this six days a week for 52 weeks a year, no holidays. At 50 Euros per customer, she ends up giving the facilitator around 300,000 Euros in one a year to pay off her debt.'**

Duco van Heel,  
Risk Analysis Unit

The operation also provided a valuable insight into irregular immigration at smaller European airports and the involvement of 'low cost' carriers in this field.

Joint Operation HAMMER was thus a major achievement and a huge blow to organised criminals attempting to exploit air routes for irregular immigration.

However, progress in the Air Border Sector did not stop there.

#### THE LEGACY

Joint Operation HAMMER had built upon the lessons learned from earlier, successful operations (such as AGELAU which targeted the trafficking of minors in Central Europe).

Then, as HAMMER successfully took air operations from the local to the regional level, increasing effectiveness many times over in the process, it was decided that the next step would be PULSAR, a programme that would run over four years.

At the same time there also came HUBBLE, an EU-wide joint operation focussing on large Third Country air transport hubs identified by the FRONTEX Risk Analysis Unit.

Joint Operation HAMMER successfully demonstrated the capacity of FRONTEX to respond swiftly





In the first three phases of Joint Operation HAMMER, 762 irregular migrants were detected at airports, resulting in 695 refusals of entry. In addition, 71 forged documents were identified. 115 airports took part in reporting procedures coordinated by the FRONTEX Situation Centre.

HAMMER provided a unique opportunity for border guards to share experiences and

exchange information, thus increasing the efficiency of communication between border guard offices at EU airports.

HAMMER overcame a major problem: short-term operations, while successful, still only produced a short term effect. But the longer, phased approach of Hammer, interspersed with periods of intense analysis, had a much greater impact on irregular immigration.

to emerging threats, changing circumstances and new phenomena at the external border. It is hardly surprising then that it so quickly spawned new and divergent operations to counter irregular immigration.

At a key moment in the history of FRONTEX, the aptly named operation HAMMER had struck the decisive blow for air border operations.

**‘Maybe you are an ambitious person living abroad, but you look for an opportunity to work in the EU. You get in touch with this criminal world of the facilitators. And from that contact, a lot of things will happen. They will take your real passport, they will give you a false passport, they will blackmail your family if you don’t pay. But if you pay, they promise you some sort of job at the other end. It is the start of an unequal relationship that leaves people at the mercy of criminals.’**

Antonio Saccone, Head of Operational Analysis and Evaluation Sector

Research & Development:

## Coming up with 'Smarter Solutions'

For some people the name of the Research and Development Unit might at first conjure up images of scientists in white laboratory coats conferring over the latest experiment against a background of test tubes or whirring computers.



FRONTEX has no laboratories. Nor does it have scientists to populate them. But the agency does have a group of highly qualified professionals who understand what is happening across a broad spectrum of relevant research.

They are the staff of the FRONTEX Research and Development Unit. Officially, their mission is 'to follow up on developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders and disseminate this information to the Commission and the Member States'.

What this means in practice is that relevant research is not just followed, but also assessed for its value in the field. And the unit's focus of interest is far wider than items of isolated technology. It also includes operational concepts and threat developments.

Furthermore, not only does the unit keep abreast of scientific and technological developments in areas of potential interest to FRONTEX, it is also active in influencing the direction of that research.

### THE EARLY DAYS

Like many of the sectors and units within FRONTEX, the Research and Development Unit has grown to its current strength from humble beginnings. When the former head of the unit, Erik Berglund,

took up the reins in early 2007 there were two staff members.

Berglund realised that his first challenge would be to establish a more prominent role for FRONTEX in European-wide research and development: 'We needed to occupy some ground in the external world if we were to be effective. And the big opportunity at that time was to get into the EU security research which had just restarted in earnest that year.'

The timing was good and the unit was able to establish solid links with various organisations, in particular the key EU Directorate-General of Justice, Freedom and Security, and Enterprise and Industry. This in turn fostered other connections, most notably with the body drawing up guidelines for future EU research (the European Security Research and Innovation Forum).

Within a relatively short period the FRONTEX Research and Development Unit was participating in evaluation of research project proposals and even found itself represented on the end-user advisory boards where it could exert useful influence on development.

After five years FRONTEX has managed to reach a critical position from which it can influence EU security research in the area of border security. The current unit head, Edgar Beugels, was an original member of the agency and has witnessed the change:



'During a recent conference it struck me how much industry is now reacting to our activities, actually following what we publish on our website, being interested in what we are planning, being eager to participate. That's a big difference from the initial period, when we were basically unknown.'

#### THE LINK

The higher profile that FRONTEx has earned for itself in the area of research and development is significant. It allows the agency to be an effective link between industry and the people on the ground, the border guards of the Member States.

The Research and Development Unit is clear about its priorities in this role: the unit exists to serve the Member States and their border guard services. Its primary aim is to identify and collect the needs of the Member States and, in Beugels' words, 'with one voice bring those needs to industry'.

That does not mean that the Research and Development Unit is deaf to what industry is also saying. Far from it. The unit needs to listen and engage with industry at every possible opportunity to do its job. But it also has to be aware of the so-called 'industry-push' of products which may be perfectly serviceable, but do not fulfil the precise needs of the Member States.



The unit is rapidly becoming the source for Member States needing advice on new technology. Now, instead of dealing with industry on a one-to-one basis, a Member State can turn to FRONTEX.

'Sometimes,' says Edgar Beugels, 'the Member States are unsure if the vendors offer them products that are useful or what kind of technical requirements they should ask for. They might feel lost. But they know we can help them.'

In order to assess the value of new technology the Research and Development Unit conducts studies. The unit is responsible for the methodology and for developing the analytical means to evaluate various alternatives, while experts from different organisations are invited to contribute in specific areas requiring specialist knowledge.

The studies conducted by the unit not only evaluate particular technologies, but serve to compile the plan for enhancing capability in the future. In

- Maritime surveillance, including radar and electro-optical sensors based on sea, land, air and space platforms, as well as vessel-tracking systems.
- Land surveillance, including radar, electro-optical sensors and seismic sensors.
- Sensor systems for detecting humans and objects inside closed compartments.
- Biometrics and electronic identity documents.
- Systems for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.
- Methodology for studies and assessment.

### The fields of interest of the Research and Development Unit

Edgar Beugels,  
Head of the Research and  
Development Unit

'For me it is **very striking** that there now exists so much outside interest in the activities of FRONTEX compared to the early days, especially from industry. **I am proud** of the R&D team.'

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
are tested for border  
surveillance purposes.



addition, they provide a forum for experts from different fields to share information with each other.

Nor has cooperation beyond the European Union been neglected. Within the framework of FRONTEX working agreements, the unit has a fruitful and growing relationship with counterparts in Third Countries, following their research and also sharing information which the unit has collected. 'It works both ways,' says Beugels. 'We learn from each other.'

## THE FUTURE

From its inception the Research and Development Unit began work in a key area of border control: biometrics and automatic border crossings. Over the years the importance of these has been increasing, as the head of the unit explains:

'More and more people in Europe have electronic passports, with a facial image and now also with a fingerprint. We have seen the introduction of the automatic border crossing system in several countries in Europe. This is expected to continue. So it's becoming more important. It's actually becoming a core element of border control.'

The other key areas identified as priorities for Research and Development in the coming years are the preparation and implementation of the Europe-

an Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and detection technology.

## CONCLUSION

In a few years the Research and Development Unit has become the crucial link between industry and the research community on the one hand and the end-users within the European Commission and the Member States, in particular the border guards, on the other.


With the increasing complexity of technological developments, the ever-changing political context in which border management operates and the constant pressure of organised criminals, the role of the unit can only become more important.

'We always have to keep in mind the fact that the number of people who cross the border is not going to diminish,' says Edgar Beugels. 'It is only going to increase. So in order to deal with ever-increasing numbers of travellers, we have to come up with the smarter solutions.'

Rapid Border Intervention:

## 'Expecting the Unexpected'

Effective border control is not only about having the most efficient organisational structure with the best people and the latest equipment. All these essential elements are of little use if they cannot be in the right place at the right time.




FRONTEX has already shown itself to be both flexible and highly adept at mounting joint operations in record time. But there is always the possibility of an even greater challenge: an unforeseen disaster which could generate a massive movement of people towards the EU external border on a scale hitherto unseen.

In such an extreme case, the border authorities of the EU Member State faced with the problem could find themselves unable to cope with the huge numbers of people attempting to enter the EU. The solution would be to rapidly deploy border guards from other Member States to provide short-term assistance during the critical period.


### FACING THE CHALLENGE

To be ready for that challenge, FRONTEX has created a pool of highly trained professionals, managed by the Pooled Resources Unit, with a multitude of skills who can be despatched immediately to any part of the external border placed under exceptional pressure. These men and women form the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT).

The members of the teams are experienced officers of national law enforcement bodies responsible for border management with a wide range of expertise. Overall, almost 700 officers from Member States are on call from the Rapid Pool.



## RABIT Experts' specialisations



The actual tasks of a deployed Rapid Border Intervention Team will vary with circumstances and will be defined on a case-by-case basis. But, in general, members of the teams have the power to perform the usual tasks associated with border control, such as document checks, carrying out surveillance and conducting interviews of undocumented persons.

### SPECIAL SKILLS

Recognising that the circumstances when a RABIT would be deployed are bound to be exceptional and urgent, an additional special training curriculum was prepared by FRONTEX. National experts of all

Member States were involved to ensure that team members possess every skill needed to operate successfully under difficult conditions at the external border.

The RABIT members have reached a high level of training and readiness. In addition to their usual expertise and knowledge, they are proficient in skills as diverse as detection of stolen vehicles, foreign languages, dog-handling and special inspections of shipping containers, buses and trains.

Moreover, they are familiar with the history of the European Union and its legislation. Particular attention has been given to the Schengen Borders Code, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the Common European Asylum System, as well as other international legal instruments such as the United Nations' 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

Furthermore, since more than three-quarters of the RABIT members also take part in joint operations, their skills are being developed in preparation for the day when they are deployed in an emergency.

Of course, should a RABIT be deployed, the underlying responsibility for control of the external border will remain with the Member States. Every Rapid Border Intervention Team will therefore have a commanding officer from the Member State which has requested assistance.


In addition, an expert from FRONTEX will be deployed as coordinating officer to facilitate cooperation between FRONTEX and the host Member State, as well as to support team members and report to FRONTEX.

**PREPARE FOR THE WORST—HOPE FOR THE BEST**

Given the multinational composition of the teams and the arrangements under which they will operate, it is not surprising that the Rapid Border Intervention Teams are an important part of building close cooperation, mutual assistance and a strong sense of solidarity between EU member States.

Fortunately, the need to deploy the Teams has not arisen. But if it does, Frontex is ready. And in the meantime, the Rapid Border Intervention Teams continue to hone skills for an eventuality no-one wants to see, but for which the EU should be prepared.

**EU Rapid Response Capacity**



Risk Analysis:

## The 'Brain' of Frontex

A photograph showing several men in dark uniforms, likely Frontex officers, gathered around a table. One man in the foreground is pointing at a document on the table. The word 'POLÍCIA' is visible on his uniform. The scene is dimly lit, suggesting an indoor office or meeting environment.

As information pours into FRONTEX from a myriad of sources, both inside and outside the European Union, it is channelled to a unit which sits at the hub of the agency's operations. The Risk Analysis Unit constantly verifies and analyses huge amounts of data to produce the intelligence that drives FRONTEX.

The challenge to the unit's members is to pull from the mass of disparate details the key facts that will set an alarm bell ringing and launch a FRONTEX joint operation. As a member of another FRONTEX unit said: 'Nothing happens without risk analysis.'

Yet five years ago, when FRONTEX started operations, the embryonic Risk Analysis Unit was not even sure what its role should be.

Javier Quesada, the Head of the Risk Analysis Unit (RAU), summed up the early days succinctly: 'It was a very small unit of seven analysts, without a clear understanding of its role. They basically had an idea of delivering some strategic product, but it was not a concept.'

Yet from that tentative start, the Risk Analysis Unit rapidly came to terms with its place in the FRONTEX mission and carved out a pivotal role which is constantly developing as the huge challenges confronting FRONTEX shift and evolve.

FRONTEX operations are intelligence-driven. As a consequence, the Risk Analysis Unit is involved across the spectrum of the agency's activities.


If a particular risk analysis shows the need for a joint operation, a recommendation is issued. But the unit's work does not stop when analysis triggers a joint operation. The unit also plays a central part in detailed planning from the moment the proposed implementation of a specific joint operation (known as a Tactical Focused Assessment) is prepared.


'Right from the start,' explained the Head of the Risk Analysis Unit, 'the analyst and the operations officer, who will produce the operational plan, both work together. There is a close collaboration on a daily basis from the beginning, right from the planning and into the implementation phase.'

After the end of an operation, an evaluation report is produced. The evaluation is used by the RAU for further analysis in order to benefit future joint operations and is also sent to Member States.

**'If you want to do something about human trafficking then for certain you have to cooperate on the international level with other organisations. First of all, of course, other EU agencies, but also international organisations and NGOs.'**

Duco van Heel,  
Risk Analysis Unit





## BEYOND FRONTEX

In a surprisingly short span of time the Risk Analysis Unit has become a prime mover in providing intelligence beyond national borders, and even further beyond the external border of the EU, in the fight against illegal immigration.

Even at the beginning when it was short-staffed and working hard to deliver what was needed to support FRONTEX internally, the unit still pursued a broader perspective.

Its aim was to start linking the national intelligence communities within the Member States and also the pan-European organisations within the EU. And when that was done, it started to explore ways of improving intelligence cooperation with Third Countries.

‘We created a whole EU community which we call the FRAN—FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network,’ said Javier Quesada. ‘We had to work on this a lot, invest a lot of time and effort, and still do. But it has been worth it.’

A large part of the challenge is encouraging a new way of thinking in intelligence communities, in particular that knowledge should be shared and not be kept locked away, as Javier Quesada explained: ‘We had to build a community based on the recognition that I need to share with you what I know so that we could work together.’

Javier Quesada,  
Head of Risk Analysis Unit

‘The biggest challenge has probably been to develop a solid, consistent data collection system. Obviously to assess what is going on we need to get the necessary information and knowledge to do it on a regular basis. This did not exist at the start.’

As the Risk Analysis Unit's success with establishing the FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network within the EU community became clear, the unit also realised that much of the knowledge it needed on a regular basis came from Third Countries. The next step was obvious.


'So,' said Javier Quesada, 'we started creating intelligence communities in Third Countries in the

Western Balkans, at the eastern borders of the EU Member States and now in Africa. And we intend to continue developing those communities.'

Cooperation with the Member States has progressed well, as perhaps might have been expected. But what has been particularly gratifying is that cooperation with Third Countries has also been successful, in some cases against expectations.

**'One of the good things about the EU border guard community is that they're open and keen to work together.'**

Mari Kalliala, Head of Analysis and Planning Sector



## RISK ANALYSIS UNIT MAIN FUNCTIONS

The Risk Analysis Unit has three main functions in supporting FRONTEX general planning and operations:

- Strategic long-term risk analysis, in the form of the Annual Risk Analysis (or ARA), which looks 18 months ahead, and its update, the Semi-Annual Risk Analysis (SARA). The Annual Risk Analysis is the basis for setting the agency's priorities. The SARA updates the Annual Risk Analysis as planning proceeds and identifies gaps as events unfold.
- Strategic mid-term risk analysis in the form of FRAN Quarterlies updating the situation

picture and trends analysis, and Tailored Risk Assessments (TRA) examining specific problems (for example, irregular migration from East Africa).

- Operational risk analysis following the FRONTEX operational cycle: Tactical Focused Assessments (TFA) facilitating the planning of Joint Operations, periodical monitoring and analytical evaluations during the operational phases, followed by final analytical evaluations of Joint Operations.

### THE WAY AHEAD

Despite the many successes, challenging work for the Risk Analysis Unit remains. One additional major goal emanating from the Lisbon Treaty and the common Internal Security Strategy is to

Mari Kalliala,  
Head of Analysis  
and Planning Sector

**'For me risk analysis is also communication and its purpose is to support decision-making and not to make it more difficult by giving someone a hundred base reports with a lot of details. It's essential to focus on the key issues.'**

strengthen the existing inter-agency cooperation with Europol and other Justice and Home Affairs agencies.

'This encompasses a specific challenge,' according to Javier Quesada. 'At the EU level we have to close the circle of domestic investigations and border control. By that I mean that border control activities have to fully take account of results of domestic investigations and, on the other hand, the results of border control activities have to be able to guide domestic activities. We are not there yet, but we will get there.'

## CIRAM: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

The Risk Analysis Unit's role goes far beyond receiving, verifying and analysing data which enables it to make recommendations for action by FRONTEX. It has a much broader role.

In 2002 the current foundation of FRONTEX's intelligence operation was developed by a European Council Expert Group. Known as the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM), it was designed to allow the compilation of risk assessments at the European level. In 2005 that responsibility devolved to FRONTEX.

In the last five years the Risk Analysis Unit has revised and adapted CIRAM to meet changing needs so that it can deliver general and tailored risk analyses not just to FRONTEX operations, but also further abroad to EU Member States' Border Guard Authorities as well as to the EU Council and Commission.

The unit's development of CIRAM has also produced results that were imported into yet another critical FRONTEX responsibility: the

development of a Common Core Curriculum for border guards' training.

The unit not only keeps abreast of methodological developments in the EU countries, it is a powerful catalyst. The FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) provides an essential forum for exchange of ideas on the subject and a platform to present current work on the revision of CIRAM to risk analysis experts from Member States.

Perhaps an even bigger challenge in the future is to deliver to the EU and its Member States the Common Pre-Frontiering Intelligence Picture (CPIP): the information and the analysis on what is happening, and may happen, in Third Countries which could affect security at the EU external border.


Risk assessments, whether short-term or long-term, are crucial to FRONTEX operations. Whether

it is assessing the likely events in the next year or more, analysing the likely effect of a particular phenomenon over the coming few months or preparing for a specific joint operation, the Risk Analysis Unit's work is always in demand.

As one FRONTEX operations officer put it: 'In the agency we all have our part to play, all the units perform their different roles. But without doubt Risk Analysis is the "brain" of FRONTEX.'

**'The last five years has been about setting up a group of people which is very balanced, very committed, with a lot of knowledge and who are excellent human beings. The biggest success, personally, without any doubt, has been building the risk analysis group, this team of people.'**

Javier Quesada,  
Head of Risk Analysis Unit



## WIDER COOPERATION

The Risk Analysis Unit contributes to wider, more effective border analysis in three ways:

- **FRAN**—the FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network consists of analysis units in Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. The FRAN Information Exchange System permits regular data exchange, such as monthly statistical reports, bimonthly analytical reports and incident reports.
- **ANTOOLS**—a programme for providing appropriate resources and analytical tools (from statistical computer programmes to satellite data) for analysis of irregular migration and the related global security environment.
- **FRONBAC**—the FRONTEX Borders Analytical Community is a programme launched by FRONTEX to further develop analytical standards and thus facilitate understanding between various risk analysis units in the EU and Third Countries by providing a variety of training at different levels.

A Longer Perspective:

# Third Countries



Border control is only part of border management. The border guard at an airport or a land border, or on a vessel in the Mediterranean, is only the most visible part of the system. The problems and challenges that the people who man the borders face daily have arisen elsewhere, sometimes thousands of miles away in a foreign country on another continent.

As people travel more often and in greater numbers, so the associated problems multiply in number and complexity. Thus additional training, information and cooperation is needed to ensure that borders function as they should: smoothing the path of law-abiding bona fide travellers, but at the same identifying those in need of protection and preventing the illegal activities of criminals, such as human traffickers.

### **PARTNERSHIPS**

Through its External Relations team, FRONTEX has fostered partnerships with Third Countries from the beginning of its operations. In many cases the advantages are obvious: transnational crime, by definition, affects both sides of a border. Combating trafficking in human beings, for example, is most effective when every part of the criminal process is tackled, from the beginning of an expensive and dangerous illicit journey for a hopeful immigrant to the all-too-frequent abuse at the destination.

Cooperation between FRONTEX and Third Countries is carried out in the context of the overall EU security strategy. This clearly establishes that border control-related activities begin in the countries of origin or transit and continue with cooperation on both sides of the external border. These are followed by further measures implemented at the external borders, as well as inside the territory of the EU Member States.

FRONTEX cooperation with Third Countries occurs across the agency's activities: from exchange of information and risk analysis assessments, through training, research and development, to operational cooperation in the field.

Current EU candidate countries have been given the highest priority, followed by neighbouring countries and others which, according to risk analyses, are considered to be countries of origin or transit of irregular migration.

In 2009 the FRONTEX External Relations team signed a record seven agreements with Third Countries, the most in any one year since FRONTEX was established and more than half the total of Third Country agreements reached so far, which now stands at twelve.

However, there is still much work to be done. The Third Country cooperation network that FRONTEX is building will continue to grow, enhancing cooperation in dealing with irregular migration and combating cross-border crime.

**‘There should be no barriers between law enforcement in the Member States and Third Countries. In a way we are all on one side of the border together and on the opposite side are the criminal organisations who are exploiting and abusing people for their criminal purposes.’**

Ilkka Laitinen,  
FRONTEX Executive Director

Wider Cooperation:

## A Helping Hand

In the fight against irregular immigration, and its more sinister manifestations such as trafficking in human beings, FRONTEX is cooperating more and more with other organisations.



Within legal limitations, such as regulations governing the collection and analysis of personal data, FRONTEX regularly exchanges information and shares analyses with the European law enforcement agency, Europol. Cooperation in this field is also being extended on an *ad hoc* basis to Interpol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

However, the responsibilities of FRONTEX are diverse, not just in terms of the goals of its operations, but also the manner in which they are carried out. To that end, FRONTEX has also established close ties with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and a number of other relevant EU Council bodies. Moreover, this will be further extended with a working arrangement to be finalised in the near future with the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).

Cooperation is also being developed in the areas of technical expertise and support. The improvement of surveillance capacity for EU border services and for FRONTEX's operational activities (in particular in the maritime domain), also necessitates close partnerships with agencies such as the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA)—with

both of whom the future sharing of assets is being explored—as well as the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Commission's research bodies.

These relationships have been, and will continue to be, especially beneficial in training and equipping border guards of not only EU Member States, but also those of Third Countries who are cooperating with FRONTEX, to carry out their important role efficiently and effectively, and in a way that meets international expectations and standards.

**'I must say that my counterparts in the FRONTEX external relations team are VERY cooperative and very supportive of UNHCR... There is in general good cooperation with, I would say, all of the units in FRONTEX. So it is definitely a very good starting point to continue building our partnership. We would like to see the partnership develop further, as regards more two-way information-sharing and more UNHCR involvement in operational aspects, among other things.'**

Michele Simone,  
current UNHCR  
Senior Liaison  
Officer to FRONTEX

Joint Return Operations:

# Coordinating a European Response



Most EU Member States (and Schengen Associated Countries) regularly return illegal immigrants to their home countries. The FRONTEX Returns Unit has the task of assisting Member States to coordinate their return operations so that they are carried out efficiently and with full respect for the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned.

The number of people being returned is determined by the judicial process in each particular Member State. Those returning to their home countries have exhausted all legal possibilities to remain on the territory of an EU Member State: they have overstayed their visas, their residence permits have expired, they have committed criminal offences on the territory of a particular country, or they are not eligible for international protection.

Most returns are made by air. FRONTEX strives to ensure that these are well coordinated amongst the Member States so that several EU nations do not simultaneously fly aircraft to the same Third Country at the same time.

A country organising a return operation informs FRONTEX, which then notifies all other Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, who may then decide to participate in the operation. The European Commission has made available €676 million to EU countries through the European Return Fund for 2008–2013 to fund their return operations.

In the five years of its operation, FRONTEX's success in improving the standards and efficiency of such flights has led to calls for an increase in its budget in this area, as well as a change in the organisation's mandate to allow it to play a more direct role in organising returns with Member States in the future.

**‘The money allocated to Frontex for its part in the system was €5.5 million in 2009. This is a fraction of to the €676 million the European Commission has made available to the Member States through the European Return Fund for 2008–2013 for their individual return operations.’**

Per Kvistholm  
Head of Joint  
Returns Sector

## The Next Five Years?



From the moment a line was first drawn between two nations on a map, border guards have been faced with the perennial problem of finding that delicate balance between security and freedom of movement.

Today, in the European Union, this traditional challenge has been extended beyond purely national considerations. With a common external border, the need for Member States to rely upon each other to safeguard their mutual security, while ensuring the free movement of people and upholding fundamental rights, has never been greater.

Five years ago FRONTEX was placed at the forefront of the Member States' solution to this new challenge. The effective combination of three elements—assessing risks, managing joint operations at the external borders of Member States, and building operational capacity—has been the key to the FRONTEX's role as the cornerstone of the European concept of Integrated Border Management.

The agency has expanded greatly from its early days in temporary headquarters in Warsaw. But from the outset, the obstacles which lay before FRONTEX, no matter how insurmountable they may have appeared at the time, have been met squarely and, for the most part, overcome.

The successes which the Agency has achieved through innovation, diligence and professional-

ism, even in the face of occasional criticism, have progressively boosted confidence in FRONTEX and smoothed the path ahead. Moreover, with each success has come better knowledge, fresh ideas and new initiatives.

FRONTEX is now providing EU border guards with specialised training and up-to-date knowledge of the latest technology, as well as enabling them to work effectively together in joint operations and share information about the latest modus operandi used by criminals.

Through this work, as well as by increasing cooperation with Third Countries and other organisations, FRONTEX will not only continue to enhance the security of the European Union's external border, but also make the border safer and its control more efficient for ever-increasing numbers of people travelling by land, air and sea.

What does the next five years hold for FRONTEX? Improvements in technological aids, more resources, wider powers? Possibly, perhaps even probably. However, one thing is certain: the demands placed on borders will become greater, not less, and FRONTEX will be in the vanguard of the European Union's strategy to meet the challenges ahead.

**'It is always a challenge to face a new situation. Now, after five years, looking back I ask myself how we could have done it better. I can only answer that I am not able to identify a specific thing that we should have done that we didn't manage to achieve. Yes, there are still challenges for us in the future, but all of them are from the outside, from the external environment. And FRONTEX is ready to meet them.'**

Gil Arias Fernández, FRONTEX  
Deputy Executive Director

# Annex




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The Structure of FRONTEX






**Border Management in the European Union**

**‘IBM is based on recognition of the fact that what happens at the border is only part of effective border management.**

**‘Knowledge and control of what happens before the border in neighbouring countries and what happens inland, once the border has been crossed, is also of vital importance.**

**‘This will only be possible if there is effective cooperation between the large number of stakeholders who have important roles to play at all stages of the border management process.’**



Gil Arias Fernández, FRONTEX Deputy Executive Director







**FRONTEX operational response in reaction to the changing migratory pressure at the external sea borders (by year)**

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Greece sea	nd	nd	31,700	30,400
Greece land	nd	nd	56,000	49,000
Italy sea	nd	20,500	37,000	9,500
Canary Islands	31,700	12,500	9,200	2,200
Malta	nd	nd	2,800	1,500






Overview of sea  
border joint operations  
coordinated by FRONTEX  
(2006–2009)

Year	Name of JO	No. of days	Host Member State / Operational Area
2006	Hera	126	Spain / Canary Islands / Atlantic
	Agios	62	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	Nautilus	11	Malta / Central Mediterranean Sea
	Poseidon	11	Greece / Aegean Sea / Eastern Mediterranean Sea
2007	Hera	285	Spain / Canary Islands / Atlantic
	Minerva	30	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	Indalo	22	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	Hermes	22	Italy / Central Mediterranean Sea
	Nautilus	69	Malta / Italy (Lampedusa) / Central Mediterranean Sea
	Poseidon	60	Greece / Aegean Sea / Eastern Mediterranean Sea
	Zeus	16	Spain, Belgium, Romania, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Latvia, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Greece
2008	Hera	406	Spain / Canary Islands / Atlantic
	Minerva	33	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	EPN-Indalo	22	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	EPN-Hermes	64	Italy / Central Mediterranean Sea
	Nautilus	152	Malta / Italy (Lampedusa) / Central Mediterranean Sea
	Poseidon	292	Greece / Aegean Sea / Eastern Mediterranean Sea
2009	EPN-Euxine	31	Romania / Black Sea
	EPN-Hera	381	Spain / Canary Islands / Atlantic
	EPN – Alpha Reinforcement	30	Portugal
	EPN-Minerva	39	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	EPN-Indalo	50	Spain / Western Mediterranean Sea
	EPN-Hermes	184	Italy / Central Mediterranean Sea
	EPN-Nautilus	172	Malta / Central Mediterranean Sea
	Poseidon	381	Greece / Aegean Sea / Eastern Mediterranean Sea
	Zeus	33	Austria, Germany, Finland, Latvia, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania
	EPN – Focal Points	84	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, France, Portugal, Romania


Year	Name of JO	Participating Member States
2006	Hera	France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
	Agios	France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
	Nautilus	France, Germany, Greece, Italy
	Poseidon	France, Greece, Italy, Poland, United Kingdom
2007	Hera	France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
	Minerva	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom
	Indalo	France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Spain
	Hermes	France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom
	Nautilus	France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Spain, United Kingdom
	Poseidon	Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom
	Zeus	Belgium, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom
2008	Hera	Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal
	Minerva	Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Germany
	EPN-Indalo	Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Romania
	EPN-Hermes	Spain, Italy, France
	Nautilus	Germany, Romania, Malta, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, France, Greece, Italy
	Poseidon	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
	EPN-Euxine	Portugal, Netherlands, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Ukraine, Romania
2009	EPN-Hera	Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal
	EPN – Alpha Reinforcement	Spain, Latvia, Portugal
	EPN-Minerva	Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal
	EPN-Indalo	Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Latvia
	EPN-Hermes	Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia
	EPN-Nautilus	Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, United Kingdom
	Poseidon	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom
	Zeus	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia
	EPN – Focal Points	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania

Overview of participation  
by country in sea border  
operations coordinated by  
FRONTEX, 2006–2007




Overview of participation by country in sea border operations coordinated by FRONTEX, 2008–2009

- |                           |   |      |
|---------------------------|---|------|
|                           |   | 2008 |
| Hera                      | ■ |      |
| Minerva                   | △ |      |
| EPN-Indalo                | ◻ |      |
| EPN-Hermes                | ○ |      |
| Nautilus                  | ● |      |
| Poseidon                  | ● |      |
| EPN-Euxine                | ☆ |      |
| EPN-Hera                  | ■ | 2009 |
| EPN – Alpha Reinforcement | □ |      |
| EPN-Minerva               | △ |      |
| EPN-Indalo                | ◻ |      |
| EPN-Hermes                | ○ |      |
| EPN-Nautilus              | ● |      |
| Poseidon                  | ● |      |
| Zeus                      | ☆ |      |
| EPN – Focal Points        | + |      |



### Airports which participate in FRONTEX operational activities




Country	Airport	IATA Code
Austria	Graz (Thalerhof)	GRZ
	Innsbruck (Kranebitten)	INN
	Klagenfurt	KLU
	Linz (Horsching)	LNZ
	Salzburg	SZG
	Vienna (Schwechat)	VIE
Belgium	Brussels (National/Zaventem)	BRU
Bulgaria	Sofia (Vrajdebna)	SOF
Cyprus	Larnaca	LCA
	Paphos (International)	PFO
Czech Republic	Brno	BRQ
	Karlovy Vary	KLV
	Ostrava (Mosnov)	OSR
	Pardubice	PED
	Prague (Ruzyně)	PRG
Germany	Cologne/Bonn	CGN
	Dortmund	DTM
	Erfurt	ERF
	Frankfurt (Rhein Main)	FRA
	Hamburg (Fuhlsbuttel)	HAM
	Hahn	HHN
	Lubeck	LBC
	Leipzig (Schkeuditz)	LEJ
	Munich (Franz Josef Strauss)	MUC
	Paderborn/Lippstadt	PAD
	Saarbrücken (Ennsheim)	SCN
	Stuttgart (Echterdingen)	STR
	Berlin (Schoenefeld)	SXF
	Berlin (Tegel)	TXL
Wetzlar	ZQW	
Spain	Malaga	AGP
	Alicante	ALC
	Barcelona Airport	BCN
	Gerona (Costa Brava)	GRO
	Las Palmas/Gran Canaria	LPA
	Madrid (Barajas)	MAD

Country	Airport	IATA Code	
Spain (cont.)	Palma de Mallorca	PMI	
	Santiago de Compostela (Santiago)	SCQ	
	Valencia	VLC	
Finland	Helsinki (Vantaa)	HEL	
France	Paris (Charles de Gaulle)	CDG	
	Lyon (Satolas)	LYS	
	Marseille (Marignane Provence)	MRS	
	Nice (Cote d'Azur)	NCE	
	Paris (Orly)	ORY	
Hungary	Budapest (Ferihegyi)	BUD	
Iceland	Reykjavik (Keflavik)	KEF	
Italy	Bari Palese	BRI	
	Bergamo	BGY	
	Bologna	BLQ	
	Brindisi	BDS	
	Catania Fontanarossa	CTA	
	Firenze Peretola	FLR	
	Milano Linate	LIN	
	Milano Malpensa	MLP	
	Napoli Capodichino	NAP	
	Palermo	PMO	
	Pisa	PSA	
	Rimini	RMI	
	Roma Ciampino	CIA	
	Italy (cont.)	Roma Fiumicino	FCO
		Torino Caselle	TRN
Trieste		TRS	
Venezia Tessera		VCE	
Verona Villafranca		VRN	
Ireland	Dublin	DUB	
	Cork	ORK	
	Shannon (Limerick)	SNN	
Lithuania	Kaunas	KUN	
	Palanga	PLQ	
	Vilnius	VNO	
Latvia	Riga (Spilve)	RIX	


Country	Airport	IATA Code	
Netherlands	Amsterdam (Schiphol)	AMS	
Poland	Gdansk (Rebiechowo)	GDN	
	Krakow (Balice)	KRK	
	Katowice (Pyrzowice)	KTW	
	Poznan (Lawica)	POZ	
	Warsaw (Okęcie)	WAW	
Portugal	Faro	FAO	
	Funchal Madeira	FNC	
	Lisbon (Portela de Sacavem)	LIS	
Porto (Pedras Rubras)	OPO		
	Romania	Cluj Napoca	CLJ
	Bucharest (Otopeni)	OTP	
Timisoara (Giarmata)	TSR		
	Sweden	Stockholm 'Arlanda	ARN
Slovenia	Ljubljana (Brnik)	LJU	
Slovakia	Bratislava (Ivanka Airport)	BTS	
	Kosice (Barca)	KSC	
	Poprad (Tatry)	TAT	
	United Kingdom	Aberdeen (Dyce)	ABZ
Birmingham International Airport		BHX	
Bristol (Lulsgate)		BRS	
Cardiff (Rhoose) – Wales, UK		CWL	
Doncaster		DCS	
Edinburgh		EDI	
East Midlands (Derby)		EMA	
Glasgow (Abbotsichn)		GLA	
Leeds/Bradford		LBA	
London (City Airport)		LCY	
London (Gatwick Airport)		LGW	
London (Heathrow Airport)		LHR	
Liverpool (Speke Airport)		LPL	
Luton Airport		LTN	
Manchester (Ringway Int'l Airport)		MAN	
Norwich Norfolk		NWI	
Prestwick		PIK	
London (Stansted)	STN		

Overview of participation  
by country in air border  
operations coordinated by  
FRONTEX, 2006–2007

- |                    |   |      |
|--------------------|---|------|
| JO Amazon I        | ■ | 2006 |
| JO Torino          | ▲ |      |
| JO Amazon II       | ■ | 2007 |
| JO Agelaus         | ● |      |
| JO Hydra           | ▲ |      |
| JO Extended Family | ● |      |
| JO Amazon III      | □ |      |
| JO Longstop        | ○ |      |
| JO Zeus (Air/Sea)  | ◻ |      |




Overview of participation  
by country in air border  
operations coordinated by  
FRONTEX, 2008–2010




Overview of participation by country in land border operations coordinated by FRONTEX, 2006–2007

- |                        |   |      |
|------------------------|---|------|
| JO FIFA World Cup 2006 | ■ | 2006 |
| JO Illegal Labourers   | ▲ |      |
| PP Focal Points        | ● |      |
| JO Poseidon 2006       | ◆ |      |
| JO Gordius             | ■ | 2007 |
| PP Focal Points 2007   | △ |      |
| JO Ariadne             | ○ |      |
| JO Herakles            | ○ |      |
| JO Poseidon 2007       | ● |      |
| PP Five Borders        | ◆ |      |
| JO Drive In            | ★ |      |
| JO Kras                | ▲ |      |
| PP Northern Lights     | ☆ |      |
| JO Eurocup 2008        | + |      |
| PP Express             | □ |      |
| JO Niris               | ⊕ |      |



Overview of participation  
by country in land border  
operations coordinated by  
FRONTEX, 2008–2009

- |                      |   |      |      |
|----------------------|---|------|------|
| JO Ariadne 2008      | ■ | 2008 |      |
| JO Five Borders 2008 | △ |      |      |
| JO Gordius 2008      | ○ |      |      |
| JO Poseidon 2008     | ○ |      |      |
| JO Focal Points 2008 | ● |      |      |
| JO Herakles 2008     | ● |      |      |
| JO Lynx              | ☆ |      |      |
| JO Drive In 2008     | ▲ |      |      |
| JO Kras 2008         | □ |      |      |
| JO Mercury           | + |      |      |
| JO Long Overstayers  | ★ |      |      |
| JO Saturn            | ■ |      | 2009 |
| JO Jupiter           | □ |      |      |
| JO Neptune           | △ |      |      |
| JO Focal Points      | ● |      |      |
| JO Good Will         | ● |      |      |
| JO Uranus            | ★ |      |      |



Overview of land  
border joint operations  
coordinated by FRONTEX  
(2006–2009)

Year	Name of JO	Host Country/ops area
2006	<b>JO FIFA World Cup 2006</b>	Germany
	<b>JO Illegal Labourers</b>	EU external land border crossing points of PL, SK, SI, HU; Border of CZ with PL and SK Schengen external land border crossing points of DE, AT, IT
	<b>PP Focal Points</b>	18 FPs operated at external European/Schengen Borders of EU
	<b>JO Poseidon 2006</b>	Greek – Turkish Land Borders; BCP of Kipi (border checks); BPUs of Feres and Soufli (border surveillance) <sup>1</sup>
2007	<b>JO Gordius</b>	Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania
	<b>PP Focal Points 2007</b>	12 FPs operated at external European/Schengen Borders of EU
	<b>JO Ariadne</b>	Germany; Poland
	<b>JO Herakles</b>	Hungary
	<b>JO Poseidon 2007</b>	Bulgaria, Greece, Italy
	<b>PP Five Borders</b>	Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania; Partner country: Ukraine
	<b>JO Drive In</b>	Slovenia
	<b>JO Kras</b>	Slovenia
	<b>PP Northern Lights</b>	Finland
	<b>JO Eurocup 2008</b>	Austria, Switzerland
	<b>PP Express</b>	Railway border crossing points at the external EU borders
	<b>JO Niris</b>	Baltic Sea region
2008	<b>JO Ariadne 2008</b>	Poland
	<b>JO Five Borders 2008</b>	Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania
	<b>JO Gordius 2008</b>	Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania
	<b>JO Poseidon 2008</b>	Bulgaria, Greece
	<b>JO Focal Points 2008</b>	14 FPs operated at external European/Schengen Borders of EU
	<b>JO Heracles 2008</b>	Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria
	<b>JO Lynx</b>	Slovakia
	<b>JO Drive In 2008</b>	Slovenia
	<b>JO Kras 2008</b>	Slovenia
	<b>JO Mercury</b>	Lithuania, Poland
	<b>JO Long Overstayers</b>	Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania
	2009	<b>JO Saturn</b>
<b>JO Jupiter</b>		Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
<b>JO Neptune</b>		Hungary, Romania, Slovenia
<b>JO Focal Points</b>		25 FPs operated at external European/Schengen Borders of EU
<b>JO Good Will</b>		Poland, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; exchange of information with Russian Federation
<b>JO Uranus</b>		Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia

Sea Border Section  
cooperation with Member  
States authorities

Member State	Authority
<b>Austria</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>Belgium</b>	Federal Police
<b>Bulgaria</b>	Border Police
<b>Cyprus</b>	Police
<b>Denmark</b>	National Police
<b>Denmark</b>	Ministry of Refugees
<b>Estonia</b>	Border Police (official name: Estonian Police and Border Guard Board)
<b>Finland</b>	Border Guard
<b>Finland</b>	Coast Guard
<b>France</b>	Border Police (=DCPF Direction Centrale de la Police aux Frontiers), Navy, Customs
<b>Germany</b>	Federal Police
<b>Greece</b>	National Police, Coast Guard
<b>Iceland</b>	Coast Guard
<b>Italy</b>	Ministry of Interior - Police, Guardia di Finanza, Guardia Costiera, Navy
<b>Latvia</b>	Border Guard
<b>Lithuania</b>	Border Guard
<b>Luxembourg</b>	Ministry of Justice / CAE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Malta</b>	Police, Armed Forces of Malta
<b>Netherlands</b>	Royal Marechaussee, Coast Guard
<b>Norway</b>	National Police
<b>Poland</b>	Border Guard
<b>Portugal</b>	SEF (Servico de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras), GNR (Guarda Nacional Republicana), Marinha (Navy)
<b>Romania</b>	Border Police
<b>Slovakia</b>	Border Police
<b>Slovenia</b>	Police
<b>Spain</b>	National Police, Guardia Civil, Navy
<b>Sweden</b>	National Police, Coast Guard
<b>UK</b>	Border Agency

Additionally to the MSs authorities listed above, SBS cooperates with the following EU bodies: ESA (European Space Agency), JRC (Joint Research Centre), ESC (European Satellite Centre), EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency).